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“The basic constitutional idea [of] neo-liberalism is the idea of changing law 
from something that functions as the immune system of society into 
something that functions as the immune system of transnational capitalism, 
triggering an autoimmune disease by declaring civil war against the rest of 
the societal body and its legislative organs.”  
Brunkhorst 2014a, 445-446 
Introduction 
Near the end of his fascinating socio-historical account of two millennia of legal 
revolutions, Hauke Brunkhorst (2014a) offers a scathing critique of the rise of the 
neoliberal constitutional mindset in the European Union (EU). Brunkhorst argues 
that the neoliberal project, in constitutional terms, aims at nothing less than 
dismantling ‘democratic legislative control’ and subsuming the ‘political constitution’ 
– the set of fundamental democratic rights and freedoms hard-won through social 
struggles - under that of ‘law and economics’ and the prerogatives of transnational 
capital. At the core of this ‘great transformation’, unfolding across Europe and 
beyond since the late 1970s, lies “the transformation of state-embedded and state-
controlled markets into market-embedded and market-controlled states” 
(Brunkhorst 2014a, 446; original emphasis). Brunkhorst’s Polanyian diagnosis closely 
resembles David Harvey’s dissection of neoliberalism as an elite political project. Its 
central aim, Harvey maintains, is to ‘disembed’ capital from the post-war Keynesian 
“web of social and political constraints” (2007, 11) or, in Brunkhorst’s words, to 
reverse the achievements of the ‘Egalitarian Revolution’, which ushered in the 
constitutionalization of social and economic rights and the consolidation of 
‘democratic capitalism’ since the early twentieth century.  
The evolution of EU governance since the 2008 financial crisis has made the 
pervasive grip of this mindset dramatically apparent, including its tragic social 
consequences in the EU’s periphery. Following the electoral victory of Syriza in 
Greece in January 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president, 
issued a stark warning to those who wish to deviate from the script laid out by 
Europe’s elites: ‘there can be no democratic choice against the European treaties’ 
(Hewitt 2015) nor, by extension, against the constitutionalization of neoliberal 
orthodoxy. The rule of the Troika, warns Brunkhorst, constitutes an outright assault 
on the Kantian mindset of collective democratic self-determination, spelling “the 
end of democracy as we know it” (Brunkhorst 2014a, 452).  
In this article, I take a cue from Brunkhorst’s analysis of the hegemony of the 
neoliberal mindset for the survival of meaningful democratic politics. Focusing on a 
central pillar of contemporary international economic law - the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement - the aim is to highlight an important limitation of Brunkhorst’s reading 
of the unravelling of Kantian advancements in international and national law in 
recent decades. The key argument proposed here is that Brunkhorst’s account is, in 
a nutshell, too state-centric, neglecting the central role of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in shaping the content, interpretation, and enforcement of the international 
legal framework governing actually-existing neoliberalism capitalism. Recent decades 
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have witnessed a vast expansion in the rights of TNCs vis-à-vis states and their 
populations, to the point where the ‘global firm’ is now considered by some observers 
as the “key institution of the post-democratic world” (Crouch 2004, 31; see also 
Chomsky 1999; Sklair 2002; Wilks 2013). Yet, aside from a brief discussion of the 
Dutch and British East India Companies during the colonial era, the modern 
business corporation - a legal invention of the nineteenth century managerial 
mindset par excellence - is conspicuously absent from Brunkhorst’s otherwise 
prescient account of the evolution of international law. The expansion of corporate 
power, I argue, is not only a root cause of the contemporary post-democratic 
predicament in the Global North but also contributes to endemic violations of basic 
social and economic rights of the global poor. Therefore, taking the role of TNCs 
in shaping the evolution of international law seriously is indispensable towards a 
critical theory of legal revolutions that engages with contemporary struggles for 
global social justice. 
 
Corporate power and post-democratic law-making 
The modern business corporation is in large part a product of a ‘legal revolution’ in 
the nineteenth century which saw a dramatic transformation and expansion of the 
rights of joint-stock companies in the United States (Sellers 1991).1 Since then, 
corporations have become a ‘constitutive element of modern capitalism’ (Djelic 
2013). Permeating virtually all spheres of the life-world, they have become 
“accepted…as the irreplaceable organisation constituting the free enterprise system” 
(Wilks 2013, 168). Propelled by the forces of economic globalization, trade and 
capital liberalization, and revolutions in communication technologies, there has been 
an exponential growth in the number of TNCs in recent decades (Sklair 2001). 
Despite its avowed commitment to ‘free trade’ and ‘free markets’, the neoliberal 
project has thus greatly expanded the influence of these ‘concentrations of private 
power’, which now occupy a central role in the global economy (Chomsky 1999, 
160). TNCs account for one third of international trade and, in 2007, made up 48 of 
the ‘100 largest economic units’ globally, with the sales revenues of the world’s largest 
company, Wal-Mart Stores, higher than the GDPs of all but the 25 wealthiest 
countries (Wilks 2013, 6).2 
In capitalist democracies, this kind of phenomenal concentration of economic wealth 
inevitably translates into political power exerted directly via political lobbying, 
advocacy and political party funding, and indirectly by shaping the ideological milieu 
within which policy-making processes unfold and by diffusing cultural norms 
favourable to corporate interests within public spheres. Indeed, since the 1970s a 
vast, multi-billion institutional complex of public-relations companies, corporate-
funded consultancies and think-tanks has emerged whose core purpose includes 
diffusing the neoliberal lingua franca of ‘free markets’ and ‘free trade’ across the globe 
and shaping the laws and regulatory standards governing markets and corporations 
(Miller & Dinan 2008).  
In the Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, Colin Crouch (2011) provides a 
compelling account of how giant corporations have effectively blurred the distinction 
between the putatively autonomous spheres of the state and the market so sacrosanct 
to classical liberal thought by gradually colonising both spheres. While global 
markets in many sectors have become structured along oligopolistic lines, the state 
has not so much been weakened as captured by corporate capital to its own ends 
through complex (and contested) processes of deregulation, marketization and 
privatization (Leys 2003; van Appeldoorn 2000). Consequently, relations between 
states and transnational capital have become so intimately intermeshed that “the 
state, seen for so long by the left as the source of countervailing power against 
markets and corporations, is today likely to be the committed ally of giant 
corporations, whatever the ideological origins of the parties governing the state” 
(Crouch 2011, 145).  
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Sustained by pervasive corporate lobbying activities, in the most advanced post-
democracies such as the UK and the US, “the large corporation is a privileged 
institution integrated into government itself through elite interaction” (Wilks 2013, 
62). In the United States, corporations’ rights of political speech were further 
extended by the Supreme Court in 2010 in the Citizens United case “which 
effectively lifted all restrictions on corporate political spending” (Wilks 2013, 11). 
For example, in the case of ‘the health-care-industrial complex’ in Washington DC 
alone, this has reached beyond US$5 billion since 1998 (Brill 2013). Needless to say, 
such resources to influence law-making processes at all levels of global governance 
vastly outnumber those of counter-veiling forces, be they trade unions, activist 
groups, NGOs, or progressive social movements. 
Though ubiquitous in contemporary political systems, the term ‘lobbying’ is, 
however, somewhat problematic:   
“The origins of the term ‘lobby’ lie in the literal meaning of the word, denoting…a 
space outside a ruler’s council chamber…where persons wishing to plead a cause with 
members of the council would a seek a chance to speak with them on their way in 
…The representatives of today’s TNCs are not in the lobby, outside the real decision-
making space of government…They are right inside the room of political decision-
making. They set standards, establish private regulatory systems, act as consultants 
to government, even have staff seconded to ministers’ offices” (Crouch 2011, 131).  
A similar process of corporate capture of policy-making is unfolding at the EU level, 
too; the institutional complex in Brussels has become a key site for corporate political 
activity. In fact, particularly in the realm of EU trade policy, the relationship between 
the European Commission and private-sector interest groups at times assumes the 
form of “reverse lobbying” where “the public authority lobbies business to lobby 
itself” (Woll 2011, 48).3  
The neoliberal reconfiguration of global capitalism has been an extremely lucrative 
affair for the privileged few, generating concentrations of wealth and levels of 
economic inequality across the industrial world not seen since the Great Depression. 
Together with the growing political power of TNCs, this constitutes both a key 
causal factor and symptom of the wider shift towards ‘post-democracy’, a system in 
which “politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of 
privileged [political and economic] elites in the manner characteristic of pre-
democratic times” (Crouch 2004, 6). Post-democracy is the political counter-part to 
the neoliberal transformation of the economy; they are two sides of the same coin. 
As Wofgang Streeck (2011) notes, “economic power seems today to have become 
political power, while citizens appear to be almost entirely stripped of their 
democratic defences”, a diagnosis lent empirical support by the 2012 Democracy 
Audit of the UK. The audit found  
“very firm grounds to suggest that the power which large corporations and wealthy 
individuals now wield on the UK political system is unprecedented. Bolstered by pro-
market policy agendas and deregulatory measures, corporate power has expanded as 
a variety of countervailing forces, such as trade unions, have declined in 
significance...[P]olicy-making appears to have shifted from the democratic arena to 
a far less transparent set of arrangements in which politics and business interests have 
become increasingly interwoven” (Wilks-Heeg et al. 2012, 16). 
In Habermasian terms, this suggests that the impulses on which the legislative and 
administrative apparatus acts rarely originate in communicative action between 
citizens in public spheres but rather in the ‘unofficial circulation of this unlegitimated 
power’ within national and transnational sites of political decision-making 
(Habermas 1996: 328). Writing about the European context, Brunkhorst alludes to 
the post-democratic predicament as  
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“the hegemony of the managerial mindset, and the reduction of politics to 
technocracy that today allows the political and economic elites to bypass and 
manipulate public opinion and democratically legitimated public law on both levels: 
the European as well as the respective national level. At the same time as it is growing 
legally, the public power of the people and its representative organs is more and more 
deprived of real power and replaced by grey networks of informal government”  
(Brunkhorst 2014b, 46).       
According to Brunkhorst this ‘evolutionary process was performed under the lead of 
the managerial mindset of Europe’s political elites and professional experts’ (ibid). 
While this is certainly correct, it is also the case that this process has been driven by 
the concerted efforts of Europe’s transnational corporate elites since the 1980s, acting 
via powerful peak business organisations such as the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists, as extensively documented by van Apeldoorn (2000). The same 
argument, as discussed further below, applies to processes of economic 
constitutionalization at the international level as well. Before we turn to the 
illustrative case of the WTO TRIPS agreement however, this raises the question of 
whether the notion of the ‘managerial mindset’ is not perhaps assigned too much 
explanatory work. At times, it appears as a transhistorical force, assuming the quality 
of a deus ex machine in Brunkhorst’s account. But if it is indeed the case, as 
Brunkhorst maintains in his typically dialectical fashion, that the managerial mindset 
need not be normatively oriented towards serving dominant class interests, then the 
question arises: who are the concrete political actors relentlessly pushing it in that 
direction?  
 
Beyond the private/public dichotomy 
An attempt to answer this question necessitates a political sociology of corporate 
power and an account of the specific strategies and practices whereby large TNCs 
attempt to shape the international legal framework and construct a system of global 
rules in line with their interests (Danielsen 2005). In other words, the role of ‘private’ 
actors must be incorporated into an analysis of not only private international law but 
international public law as well, which far too often is seen as the preserve of states 
alone. One reason for this is that, historically, international law has been state-
centric. Despite recent developments in international human rights and economic 
law, non-state entities such as TNCs do not as yet constitute clearly defined subjects 
of international public law (Duruigbo 2008). Nonetheless, the deeply problematic 
nature of the public-private distinction in liberal theories of international law was 
recognised by Wolfgang Friedman some four decades ago: 
“International companies or cartels - though often controlling enormous assets and 
exercising vast powers not only over their members in different countries but over 
economic and political decisions of great magnitude - have been treated as 
institutions and arrangements of private law. In this field perhaps more than in any 
other, the unreality of any watertight distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ law… 
is becoming increasingly apparent” (Friedman 1957, 172). 
Today, the distinction has clearly become even more empirically untenable. What is 
more, as Cutler (1997) argues, the public/private dichotomy effectively “operates 
ideologically to obscure the operation of private power in the global political 
economy” (Cutler 1997, 279) and the extent to which organised corporate interests 
have been able to shape the evolution of international public law in recent decades.  
Indeed, in parallel to the Egalitarian Revolution and the constitutionalization of 
social and economic rights around the world, the post-1945 era has witnessed the 
emergence of an international legal and institutional framework which has greatly 
facilitated the growing importance of TNCs as political actors in global governance 
(Wilks 2013). Decision-making in core economic policy domains has shifted beyond 
Westphalian boundaries towards an institutional architecture consisting of 
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international financial institutions and the WTO, elite clubs such as the G8/20 and 
the OECD, together with rather more opaque but important bodies like the World 
Banks’ International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
Alongside these institutions, various transnational elite policy planning forums have 
emerged such as the ERT, the World Economic Forum, and the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue – key sites of power inhabited by factions of transnational political, 
economic, bureaucratic elites who operate with minimal publicity and, thus, 
accountability to wider publics.  
At the same time, a complex web of international treaties from the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to the WTO, plus thousands of bilateral 
and regional trade and investment agreements, has significantly enhanced the 
prerogatives of transnational capital and corporations in the global economy and 
imposed new legal and normative constraints on state behaviour. A prime example 
is the instrument of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) - a core feature of the 
international investment regime - which allows foreign investors to challenge a host 
state in international arbitration courts if they deem that their investments are being 
harmed by regulatory or legislative changes.4 ISDS arbitration panels can override 
domestic courts, penalise states and award multi-billion compensations to investors. 
What is more, ISDS does not provide for an appeals process, proceedings and rulings 
are often kept confidential, while arbitration panels consist of elite lawyers trained in 
international investment law who normally work for corporate clients (Corporate 
Europe Observatory & Transnational Institute 2012). ISDS thus effectively 
constitutes a parallel international legal system “intended to shield the market from 
the intrusion of vulgar democratic politics” (Schneiderman 2001, 531). In other 
words, it embodies the ‘categorical imperative’ of the neoliberal constitutional 
mindset: “Give the judges what you have taken from the democratic legislator and 
the parliamentary controlled government!” (Brunkhorst 2014a, 444). 
Yet, while the codification of second-generation human rights in the form of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) is explored in considerable detail, an analysis of international 
economic law is comparatively sparse in Brunkhorst’s account. This seems 
particularly odd given the fact that international trade and investment law is 
supported by precisely those enforcement mechanisms – such as the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism and ICSID – that are currently lacking in the case of the ILO 
or the UDHR.  
Let us now briefly turn to the instructive case of the WTO TRIPS agreement, the 
origins of which reveal much about the capacity of TNCs to translate private interests 
into public law. 
 
TRIPS: A quiet revolution in international economic law     
As Susan Sell argues in her authoritative account, the WTO agreement represents 
“a stunning triumph of the private sector in making global IP rules and in enlisting 
states and international organizations to support them” (Sell 2003, 163). In brief, the 
origins of the agreement lie in the concerted agency of a small number of US-based 
corporate executives of some of the largest pharmaceutical, chemical and software 
corporations such as Pfizer, Merck, IBM and Monsanto, who were determined to 
globalize American intellectual property standards. With privileged access to trade 
policy-makers and by skillfully framing stronger intellectual property protection as a 
means to address the perceived loss of competitiveness of the US economy since the 
late 1970s, the corporate lobby was able to conscript the power of the American state 
to coerce developing countries into ever-stricter TRIPS standards by imposing trade 
sanctions for alleged violations of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of US 
corporations. 
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The US-based lobby then engaged in a ‘massive consensus-building exercise’ to get 
their initially reluctant private sector counterparts and governments in the EU and 
Japan to endorse a binding treaty that would significantly expand IPRs around the 
world (Drahos & Braithwaite 2002, 116). The Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE)5 – ‘the key portal of European business 
influence’ in Brussels – together with influential organisations such as the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations lobbied heavily to 
enlist the support of the European Commission and key EU member states (Drahos 
& Braithwaite 2002, 128). By the time the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations 
were in full swing in the late 1980s, the EU was fully committed to the TRIPS 
project (Pugatch 2004).  
The ideological pre-condition for what became a radical expansion of the rights of 
intellectual property owners was to tie the protection of intellectual property to the 
wider project of creating a global ‘liberal trading order’ that ‘would place investors 
first’ (Drahos & Braithwaite 2002, 68). As Sell explains: “By wrapping themselves in 
the mantle of ‘property rights’ the private sector activists suggested that the rights 
they were claiming were somehow natural, unassailable, and automatically deserved” 
(2003, 51). Henceforth, violations of patents, trademarks, and copyrights were 
tantamount to piracy and expropriation and, given the massive rise in trade in 
knowledge goods, antithetical to the neoliberal vision of the global economy that 
was taking hold at the time. Once intellectual property was grafted onto the ‘free’ 
trade agenda - hence the term trade-related - the issue was simply how far the new 
regime would go in expanding those rights. Indeed, early drafts of what eventually 
became the TRIPS agreement were drafted by corporate-funded lawyers and, in the 
case of the United States, corporations “provided considerable legal support to the 
negotiating team” (May 2000, 82). Facing little organised opposition from civil 
society or the Global South (with the exception of India and Brazil), the corporate 
lobby ultimately “got 95 percent of what it wanted” (Sell 2003, 115).  
The WTO agreement came into force in 1995. As Drahos and Braithwaite note, it 
marked “the beginning of a quiet revolution in the way that property rights in 
information were defined and enforced in an emerging global information economy” 
(Drahos & Braithwaite 2002, 19). In brief, the TRIPS agreement stipulates the 
minimum level of intellectual property protection that member states must enforce 
in domestic law, with significant implications for the creation, ownership, 
dissemination of, and access to, knowledge goods (May 2000). Most contentiously, 
WTO members must guarantee patent protection for a minimum of twenty years, 
including in the field of pharmaceuticals. During this period, patent-owners are 
effectively granted monopoly power. Consequently, “pharmaceutical patents, by 
design and function, increase the price of medicines to consumers” (Abbott 2002, 
18). In the case of life-saving HIV treatment, this enabled pharmaceutical companies 
to charge more than US$10 000 per patient per year in the late 1990s, including in 
the poorest countries of the Global South. To fully appreciate the significance of the 
agreement for public health, we must recall that pharmaceutical products were not 
patentable in most developing countries prior to TRIPS, or only with significant 
limitations (Hoen 2009).6 In India and Brazil, this allowed for the emergence of 
generic pharmaceutical industries which supply affordable medicines to the rest of 
the world. One major consequence of the new system has been to significantly 
diminish the policy space available to countries for promoting their knowledge-based 
industries and to limit their capacity to provide citizens with affordable essential 
medicines. 
Intellectual property revolves around a delicate balance between private and public 
interests, that is, “between the private ownership of the fruits of intellectual labour 
and the social benefit of the distribution or useful ideas or knowledge” (May 2000, 
10). The social contract between rights-holders (say, pharmaceutical corporations) 
and the rest of society is therefore maintained only if the benefits of, for example, 
developing medicines that extend or enhance the quality of life, outweigh the costs 
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of temporary monopoly power. But, as many critical observers contend (Sell 2003; 
May 2000), the WTO agreement has shifted the balance between public and private 
interests decisively towards the latter. It has effectively created an international legal 
system for the transfer of rents from the Global South to the North or, more 
precisely, major American and European corporations who are the primary owners 
of intellectual property and the agreement’s erstwhile architects.  
The WTO agreement was a project whose success lay in the ability of the private 
sector lobby to forge an elite consensus amongst a relatively small number of senior 
corporate executives and key policy-makers at different levels of global governance. 
For the senior executive of Pfizer, which spearheaded the campaign since the 1980s, 
this was about ‘influencing the public policy agenda and ultimately securing the right 
regulatory agenda’:  
“Like the beat of a tom-tom, the message about intellectual property went out along 
the business networks to chambers of commerce, business councils, business 
committees, trade associations and peak business bodies. Progressively Pfizer 
executives…were able to enrol the support of [business] organizations for a trade-
based approach to intellectual property. With every such enrolment the business 
power behind the case for such an approach became harder and harder for 
governments to resist” (Drahos & Braithwaite 2002, 69-70). 
The campaign to establish the existing TRIPS regime thus occurred almost entirely 
outside the public sphere. The general public simply did not figure in the equation 
and the mass media played only a subsidiary role in the lobbying effort. Instead, the 
corporate lobby mobilised influential policy think-tanks like the Heritage 
Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute to disseminate pro-TRIPS 
messages within policy elite circles (Drahos & Braithwaite 2002, 70). The TRIPS 
project thus did not constitute a ‘normative learning process’ (Brunkhorst 2014a) in 
sociological terms, in so far as mass publics were almost entirely excluded from elite 
considerations. As international trade negotiations are conducted with minimal 
publicity, it is unlikely that many outside the insular trade policy arena were aware 
of the agreement’s existence, let alone its possible disastrous implications for the 
global poor (see below). Yet, although it occurred outside those momentous 
historical shifts that are the focus of Brunkhorst’s work, TRIPS is emblematic of 
how contemporary international economic law is made. It is a product of the ‘factual 
strength of privileged interests to assert themselves’ by circumventing the public 
sphere (Habermas 1996, 150) that characterises the exercise of political power under 
conditions of globalised post-democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
TNCs have become key actors in transnational class struggles and the dialectical 
interplay between the Kantian and managerial mindsets in recent decades, struggles 
whose outcomes steers the evolution of international law. Through the example of 
the ‘quiet’ legal revolution in international property rights law, I have tried to 
illustrate the importance of bringing the corporation into the centre of analysis.  
The expansion of the rights of these largely unaccountable institutions is at the root 
of many emancipatory civil society struggles around the world, including those led 
by victims of corporate human rights abuses (Amnesty International 2014). Indeed, 
as Brunkhorst shows time and again, Kantian ideals of freedom, universal human 
rights, and political autonomy can be repressed but they can, and often do, “strike 
back against the law’s oppressive (and frequently effective) use as class justice” 
(Brunkhorst 2014a, 3). The global campaign for access to AIDS medicines is a case 
in point. At the turn of the millennium, a transnational network of NGOs, activists 
and ordinary citizens emerged to protest against the injustice of denying life-saving 
medicines to millions of people dying of HIV/AIDS. The campaign exposed that the 
high cost of these medicines was not an ineluctable, if regrettable, predicament of 
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the social world. Rather, it was, at least in part, the product of the existing global 
patent regime and the pricing policies of pharmaceutical corporations which had 
succeeded in capturing the trade agendas of the most powerful economic blocs, and 
thus susceptible to political change. And although the WTO TRIPS agreement 
remains firmly in place and is, in fact, being expanded via various bilateral and 
plurilateral trade agreements (Sell 2011), the inherent tension between two rights 
enshrined in international law - the private rights of intellectual property-owners 
and the human right to health  – can no longer be effaced from public discourse.   
The WTO TRIPS agreement was one of the main grievances around which the 
alter-globalisation movement had coalesced in the late 1990s, a movement which has 
challenged the colonization of ever more spheres of social and political life by 
corporate capital. Most recently, a key arena of political struggle is the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently being negotiated between the 
US and the EU. With potentially far-reaching and detrimental economic, social and 
environmental impacts, a growing civil society campaign in Europe is challenging the 
treaty’s substantive content and democratic illegitimacy. One of the most contentious 
clauses of the proposed agreement concerns ISDS. As Colin Crouch (2014) argues, 
TTIP is a thoroughly post-democratic treaty and what binds the campaigns against 
TRIPS and TTIP together is opposition to attempts by transnational elites to undo 
the ‘normative constraints’ of the Egalitarian Revolution – namely, the system of 
national and international laws designed to protect public health, workers, consumers 
and the biosphere from the (self-)destructive forces of unregulated markets 
dominated by concentrations of private power. 
To conclude, if we accept that TNCs are perhaps the dominant institutions of the 
post-democratic era and demonstrably implicated in systemic violations of basic 
human rights, then no critical theory of legal revolutions – which Brunkhorst’s work 
has done so much to advance - can proceed without addressing the question of 
unaccountable corporate power, a force driving the hollowing-out of democratic 
systems, or whatever is left of them. 
 
Notes 
1] “[T]hrough a bizarre legal alchemy”, the US Supreme Court’s recognition of corporate 
personhood affected the radical transformation of corporations from institutions with narrowly 
defined purposes into legal ‘persons’ with an indefinite lifespan, the right to acquire property, limited 
liability for shareholders, the First Amendment right to political speech, and protection by the 14th 
Amendment rights of due process “originally entrenched in the Constitution to protect freed slaves” 
(Bakan 2005, 16). Over the course of several decades, “the political rights of individual citizens came 
to be conferred on” these legal entities, with “profound implications for American democracy” (Wilks 
2013, 11). 
 
 
2] Some economists would no doubt point to the problematic nature of the analogy between national 
GDP rates and company revenues but the point about the concentration of economic wealth holds 
nonetheless.  
 
3] For example, the influential Brussels-based European Services Forum - whose members include 
the Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and the European Banking Federation - was created in the late 1990s at 
the instigation of EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan. The intention was to enable major 
European corporations across the financial and other services sectors to more effectively communicate 
their demands to EU trade officials regarding ongoing WTO negotiations (Lietaert 2009). 
 
4] In recent years, ISDS has been used to challenge public health policies (e.g. plain cigarette 
packaging proposals in Uruguay and Australia), environmental legislation (e.g. Germany’s post-
Fukushima nuclear phase-out), and labour standards (South Africa’s post-apartheid Black Economic 
Empowerment programme). 
 
5] Since then renamed BusinessEurope. 
 
6] In fact, pharmaceutical products were excluded from patentability in parts of Europe until the late 
1970s (Hoen 2009, 9). 
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